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Nearly a quarter of a century ago, Professor Charles L. Black
attempted to give some direction to the development of admiralty ju-
risdiction by suggesting some innovative jurisdictional rules.1  The
suggested rules were, in his opinion, more rational than -the old, which
were in reality inherently uncertain and impractical ' and thus failed
to possess the utility which their apparent simplicity would suggest.
Moreover, his suggested tests were preferable because they included
things within admiralty jurisdiction which "ought" to be there instead
of mechanically leading to illogical results as did the existing rules.
The specific content of Professor Black's suggested tests is not directly
related to our inquiry, since the was concerned with the whole of the
admiralty power and attempted to articulate a definition of the entire
jurisdictional scope of a separate constitutionally created special court
-a "sort of one-industry Tribunal of Commerce."' Our fundamental
concern is only with admiralty jurisdiction in tort cases. However, our
inquiry 'has the same objective as Professor Black's broader undertak-
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1. Black, Admiralty Jurisdiction: Critique and Suggestions, 50 CoLUM. L. REV.
259 (1950).
2. Consider, for example, Professor Black's basic arguments against the old local-
ity test for admiralty tort jurisdiction:
Since a "tort," a mental construction, doesn't "take place" anywhere, the ap-
plication of this "test" gives rise to an open series of "and-now-what-if's,"
reminiscent intellectually of those discussions of fine points in the law of
keeping bees which once rang through the Halls of Tara, and pictorially of
the Marx Brothers running up and down gang planks one jump ahead of the
cops. But the "test" is subject to the much more fundamental objection that
it refers, however imperfectly, to arbitrary locality rather than to real and
practical relation with the business and commerce of the sea. Id. at 264.
3. Id. at 276. Professor Black suggested that admiralty jurisdiction should extend
[n tort, [to] all those cases seeking relief for tortious conduct with respect
to the subject-matter of [business arrangements concerned primarily with sea,
lake, and river transport], or for injuries by or to vessels or other maritime
objects, or injuries to persons taking place in connection with the conduct of
the business of shipping. Id. at 274.
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ing-to identify the incongruities and deficiencies in current jurisdic-
tional rules, and to formulate a reasonable rule which will operate with
more predictability and produce -results compatible with the substan-
tive policies of admiralty law.4
We propose to identify the features which we think -any "good"
jurisdictional rule should possess-in admiralty or elsewhere-as well
as features which accommodate the specialized needs of the admiralty
area. To that end, we think that any good jurisdictional test should
achieve two distinct results: first, the test should be clear enough to
avoid unnecessary litigation over the procedural formulation of the ju-
risdictional rule at the threshold of the lawsuit, which is to say that
the basic mechanism of -the rule should be clear. The need for clarity
seems obvious: litigation concerning application of the jurisdictional
rule is wasteful since it rarely advances the substantive rights of the
disputants. Second, because jurisdictional provisions are the hand-
maidens of the substantive law, jurisdictional tests should focus upon
all and only those factors relevant to the existence of the jurisdiction.
Recently, the Supreme Court of the United States in Executive Jet
Aviation v. City of Cleveland5 took 'an important step toward the goal
of creating a coherent rule for admiralty tort jurisdiction. Nevertheless,
it will be argued that the Executive Jet decision falls considerably short
of meeting the desirable standards for a complete jurisdictional rule.
It is clear that the Supreme Court in Executive Jet adopted
a new approach by rejecting the old locality test for admiralty tort ju-
risdiction. At the same time, the Court did not completely abandon
that test. Under the old locality test for admiralty tort jurisdiction an-
nounced by Joseph Story in 1813, 6 the place where the tort occurred
was exclusively determinative of admiralty jurisdiction and the appli-
cability of admiralty law. Since the jurisdiction of the -admiralty court
originated in a constitutional grant of limited and specialized powers,7
4. See note 142 infra.
5. 409 U.S. 249 (1972).
6. See Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 253 (1972);
Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202, 205 (1971); Thomas v. Lane, 23 F. Cas.
957 (No. 13,902) (C.C. Me. 1813), cited in Askew v. American Waterways Operators,
Inc., 411 U.S. 325, 340 (1973). Justice Story stated:
In regard to torts I have always understood, that the jurisdiction of the ad-
miralty is exclusively dependent upon the locality of the act. The admiralty
has not, and never (I believe) deliberately claimed to have any jurisdiction
over torts, except such as are maritime torts, that is, such as are committed
on the high seas, or on waters within the ebb and flow of the tide. Thomas
v. Lane, 23 F. Cas. 957, 960 (C.C. Me. 1813).
7. The power of the federal district courts to hear "all cases of admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction" represents a unique attempt within the federal system to establish
a separate, specialized tribunal as prescribed by the United States Constitution and im-
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plemented by statute. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. For the statutory enactments vesting
the district courts with this constitutionally delineated power, see 1 Stat. 76-77 (1789);
28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1970). The district courts, by the Judiciary Act of 1789, were
granted "exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jur-
isdiction . . . saving to suitors, in all cases, the right of a common law remedy, where
the common law is competent to give it . . . ." It is important to note that the "saving
to suitors" clause in no way limits the power of the federal courts to hear cases falling
within the jurisdictional grant, but merely "allows, to a limited extent, application
of the common law." Note, Admiralty Jurisdiction: Executive Jet in Historical
Perspective, 34 Omo ST. L.J. 355, 357 (1973). Further, the jurisdictional grant
carries with it a rulemaking power which permits the creation of substantive rules of
law by the federal courts, and which preempts state law when exercised. Southern Pac.
Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1916). Of course this presumptive rulemaking power ex-
tends only so far as Congress has from time to time extended jurisdictional competence
to the federal courts by enacting statutes to implement article HI, section 2 of the Con-
stitution. Exactly how far Congress has gone in extending this competency has histori-
cally been the subject of much debate, scholarly comment, and confusing case law.
Much has been written concerning this question and the historical development of ad-
miralty jurisdiction generally as it relates to essential questions of federalism, strategic
advantages accruing to litigants in admiralty jurisdiction, and a host of other factors.
The historical development of the admiralty jurisdiction, particularly as viewed
from the standpoint of judicial reasoning about the extent of the potential admiralty
powers vested in the federal courts at any given time, sheds much light on the magni-
tude of this issue. Basically, the American Revolution and the creation of the federal
system resulted in a monopoly of the admiralty powers by the federal courts pursuant
to article III, section 2 of the Constitution. This produced a number of significant
results. First, it freed the federal courts from even the rather negligible restrictions
which had been previously placed upon American admiralty tribunals, principally
through colonial legislative adoption of English statutory restrictions on admiralty jur-
isdiction. Several ancient restrictive Parliamentary enactments had been made of force
in the colonies by specific adoption. For example, for the provisions in force in South
Carolina, see 2 Stat. of S.C. 446 (Cooper ed. 1837), which sets out the text of a co-
lonial enactment of 1712 adopting the statutes of 13 Rich. 11, c. 5 (1390), and 15 Rich.
II, c. 3 (1392). These ancient English statutes were at the heart of centuries of debate
about the scope of admiralty jurisdiction in England. Though the final result of the
jurisdictional struggle differed according to the subject matter involved, e.g., maritime
contracts as opposed to torts, the statutes ultimately came to be interpreted by the En-
glish common law courts as establishing the "infra corpus comitatus" rule for tort juris-
diction. This made the shoreside boundaries of the counties the point where the ad-
miralty jurisdiction ended and the common law jurisdiction began, regardless of the es-
sential maritime significance of the tort involved in any given case. The resultant nar-
rowing of the competency of the English admiralty courts, brought about largely by
the sustained competition and hostility of the common law courts, lasted until well after
the American Revolution. The restricted nature of English admiralty jurisdiction was,
however, in contrast to the relatively more extensive powers exercised by colonial vice
admiralty courts. For an excellent discussion of the background of the American ad-
miralty jurisdiction established by the U.S. Constitution, see D. ROBERTSON, ADMmALTY
AND FEDERALISM 28-64 (1970). Significantly, the federal monopoly created by the
Constitution resulted in a rather thoroughgoing rejection of the English jurisdictional
limitations. This development was supported in large part by the historically question-
able assumption, ultimately adopted by the federal courts, that a broad interpretation
of article m, section 2 of the Constitution was consistent with the previous, al-
most unfettered, powers of colonial admiralty tribunals, and was thus also consistent
with the intent of Congress in their treatment of admiralty powers in the original Ju-
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this test has traditionally been strictly construed. 8  So unwilling were
the courts of the admiralty to extend their jurisdiction to include mari-
time-related torts occurring near but not upon the navigable waters
that a congressional act was required to extend the admiralty jurisdic-
tion to include torts caused by maritime vessels -when the situs of the
tort was on the land or an extension thereof.9 Prior to Executive Jet
diciary Act. See D. ROBERTSON, supra, at 65-103.
In the American case law, the "tidewater limitation," which was a product of the
ongoing struggle between English admiralty and the common law courts, was initially
adopted in The Steamboat Thomas Jefferson, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 428 (1825). This
rule limited the extent of the admiralty jurisdiction exercised by the federal courts to
waters within the ebb and flow of the tide. This test was subsequently stretched
beyond any rational application in Waring v. Clarke, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 441 (1847),
which held that the ebb and flow of the tide affected waters on the Mississippi River over
two hundred miles from the ocean. Federal policy, as opposed to empirical analysis,
clearly emerged as the basis for the jurisdictional test with the ultimate rejection
of the tidewater doctrine by the Supreme Court in the case of Genessee Chief v.
Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851). The holding of Genessee Chief was
superficially predicated upon a congressional statute of 1845, 5 Stat. 726 (1845),
granting the federal courts jurisdiction over certain causes arising on the Great
Lakes, and was arguably merely a congressional attempt to expand the then un-
distributed jurisdictional competency beyond that granted to the federal courts by
the Judiciary Act of 1789. The Genessee Chief decision has, however, come to
be regarded as a conscious attempt to define the extent of admiralty power originally
granted to the federal courts under the 1789 Act, and thus as a definition of the juris-
dictional rule for all waters subject to federal power. The case has, probably correctly,
been interpreted as a fundamental rejection of previous limitations on the original juris-
dictional grant of 1789. See D. ROBERTSON, supra, at 115-17.
Genessee Chief extended admiralty jurisdiction, with its concomitant rulemaking
competency, to all waters of the United States navigable in interstate or foreign com-
merce. Out of this situation emerged the "locality test" for tort jurisdiction, which was
utilized over the years to refine concepts of situs pertaining to torts and their physical
relationship to bodies of water qualifying under the navigability test. This rule, we
contend, has often skewed the basic substantive considerations supporting the applica-
tion of admiralty law.
For other literature dealing with the historical development of admiralty jurisdic-
tion in both England and America in addition to the above cited authorities, see G. GIL-
MORE & C. BiAcK, THE LAw OF ADMIRALTY 1-47 (1957); D. ROBERTSON, supra, at 35
n.32 and sources collected therein; F. WISwALL, THE DEVELOPMENT or? ADMIRALTY Ju-
IUSDICTION AND PRACTICE SINCE 1800, AN ENGLISH STUDY WITH AMERICAN COMPARISONS
(1970), reviewed in 16 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 274 (1972); Mears, The History of Admir-
alty Jurisdiction, in 2 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLo-AMERIcAN LEGAL HISTORY 312 (1908);
Note, From Judicial Grant to Legislative Power: The Admiralty Clause in the Nine-
teenth Century, 67 1-ARv. L. REv. 1214 (1954).
8. See The Plymouth, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20, 35-36 (1865).
9. The Admiralty Extension Act, 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1970), was passed in 1948 spe-
cifically to overrule the strict interpretation of the locality test which had been promul-
gated in The Plymouth, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20 (1865). The Act provided in part:
The admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States shall extend to
and include all cases of damage or injury, to person or property, caused by
a vessel on navigable water, notwithstanding that such damage or injury be
done or consummated on land.
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the old locality test had been invoked rather mechanically. In Wein-
stein v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.,10 it was invoked to create admiralty ju-
risdiction on behalf of the claims of the representatives of the victims
of an airline tragedy which took place in Boston harbor. The court
concisely explained the traditional rule it employed: "If the tort oc-
curred on navigable waters, the claim is one that fies within the juris-
diction of the courts of -admiralty; nothing more is required."" It
was this construction of the rule that the Supreme Court in Executive
Jet clearly rejected.
However, what the Supreme Court placed in the old rule's stead
is much less clear. The Court in Executive Jet formulated some sort
of a "locality plus" rule for admiralty jurisdiction:
[W]e conclude that the mere fact that the alleged wrong "occurs" or
"is located" on or over navigable waters-whatever that means in an
aviation context-is not of itself sufficient to turn an airplane negli-
gence case into a "maritime tort." It is far more consistent with the
history and purpose of admiralty to require also that the wrong bear
a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity. We hold that
unless such a relationship exists, claims arising from airplane accidents
are not cognizable in admiralty in the absence of legislation to the con-
trary.1 2
It cannot be disputed that, in -the Court's view, locality is still a part
of the test for admiralty jurisdiction, since the Court cites the existing
locality test with some approval in the initial portion of its opinion. 3
However, it is not made explicit what the role of locality is specifically
intended to be. Furthermore, as close as the Court comes to a pre-
cise statement of what it means to have a "sufficient relationship to
traditional maritime activity" in the context of aviation disasters is
found in its criteria that the airplane at the time of the accident "be
performing a function traditionally performed by waterborne ves-
sels."' 4 Thus, under the current test, both locality plus a maritime re-
lationship, or nexus, must in some unspecified form exist. Clearly
such a formulation of ,the jurisdictional rule is itself bound to produce
10. 316 F.2d 758 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 940 (1963).
11. Id. at 761 (emphasis added; footnote omitted).
12. 409 U.S. at 268.
13. Id. at 253-54. "The Court has often reiterated this rule of locality." See also
Watson v. DIS A/S Idaho, 359 F. Supp. 496, 499 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Maryland v.
Amerada Hess Corp., 356 F. Supp. 975, 976 (D. Md. 1973); 4 J. MAma m L. & Com.
637, 642 (1973).
14. 409 U.S. at 271. For example, a helicopter can perform the functions of a
crew boat for an offshore oil platform. See Higginbotham v. Mobil Oil Corp., 357
F. Supp. 1164 (W.D. La. 1973) and text accompanying notes 97 & 98.
Vol. 1974:7571
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confusion, both in respect to the meaning of its constituent elements
and its operation in practice.
Therefore, we contend -that the rule as stated by the Supreme
Court fails to establish understandable guidelines -and that it will there-
fore produce the very results which the Court sought -to avoid by aban-
doning the strict locality test: a ,test filled with "perverse and casuistic
borderline situations."'15 We also assert that meaningful guidelines for
a more rational jurisdictional test can be found in the existing juris-
dictional trends in non-admiralty areas. We therefore propose (i) to
analyze the antecedents of the Executive Jet decision, (ii) to analyze
the rule announced in Executive Jet by considering the possible inter-
pretations of the rule, (iii) to examine the application of the rule in
subsequent cases to illustrate the uncertainty of the new test, and (iv)
to indicate those features of admiralty law, both jurisdictional and sub-
stantive, which have caused this uncertainty. We shall then propose
an alternative rule designed to eliminate these defects by associating
the exercise of admiralty jurisdiction with identifiable maritime con-
cerns such as torts committed by the performers of maritime functions,
rather than with the illusory test of locality alone.
PRE-Executive Jet OVERTURES TowARD THE CREATION
OF A NEw RULE
The first difficulty in ,analyzing the new jurisdictional -rule of Ex-
ecutive Jet arises with the failure of the Court to clarify the ambigui-
ties in the case law which it purported to follow. It therefore becomes
useful to examine the principal federal cases anticipating the decision
in Executive Jet and to analyze briefly both the manner in which they
sought to depart from the strict locality rule as well as -the method
which they used in -applying the new tests which they created. It is
in methodology that the most apparent ambiguity of -the Executive Jet
rule has its genesis.
Fundamental to understanding Executive Jet is Chapman v. City
of Grosse Pointe Farms.'6  In Chapman, the plaintiff dove from a
recreational pier owned by the city, injuring himself in the shallow
adjoining waters. The plaintiff -alleged that the city had been negli-
gent in 'failing to erect sufficient barriers or warning signs along the
15. 409 U.S. at 255.
16. 385 F.2d 962 (6th Cir. 1967). This case was relied upon by the district court
in the Executive Jet litigation. See 409 U.S. at 251. See generally Peytavin v. Gov-
ernment Employees Ins. Co., 453 F.2d 1121 (5th Cir. 1972); Gowdy v. United States,
412 F.2d 525 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 690 (1969); Note, New Guidelines
for Admiralty Tort Jurisdiction, 48 InD. L.J 87 (1972).
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pier.1 7  Following a dismissal for want of jurisdiction by -the district
court, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit was presented with
two questions of law arising out of -the case. The first involved
the difficulty inherent in determining the actual situs of 'the tort, since
in borderline cases in admiralty jurisdiction it is often the case that
the place of the injury is indefinite, as "a claimant has usually suffered
some injurious impact upon both land and water.""' After citing lan-
guage from two not entirely consistent cases, Minnie v. Port Huron
Terminal Co.'9 (which stands for the classical "consummation test,"
that is, that the place of the tort is located at the place of actual injury)
and Thomas v. Chesapeake Yacht Club, Inc. 20 (which 'held that the
place of the tort is found at the point where the negligence "becomes
operative or effective on the plaintiff '2 1), the Chapman court held in
effect that when the tortious conduct is integrally related with some
action in or on navigable waters, rather than with conduct which is only
fortuitously related to some adjacent body of water, the place of the
-tort is found to be within the sphere of admiralty jurisdiction.2 Sec-
ond, the court entertained the question whether the libel at bar by
its nature was suitable for treatment under the law of admiralty in fed-
eral court. Holding that "it might be said that some relationship
between the alleged wrong and maritime service, navigation or com-
merce on navigable waters, is a condition sub silentio to admiralty ju-
risdiction, '12 3 the court of appeals departed from the majority view re-
garding such cases,24 and held that some maritime element is required
17. 385 F.2d at 963.
18. Id. at 964.
19. 295 U.S. 647 (1935), cited in Chapman v. City of Grosse Point Farms, 385
F.2d at 964. In Minnie, a longshoreman was struck by a cargo hoist while working
on the deck of a vessel. The court concluded that admiralty jurisdiction was present
by applying a rule focusing on the place where the injury was received. 295 U.S. at
648.
Oddly enough, the very same rule had operated in a previous case to deny juris-
diction where the injured party, a longshoreman, happened to be standing on a pier
when he was struck by a cargo sling from a ship. See T. Smith & Son v. Taylor, 276
U.S. 179 (1928). See generally Executive let Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409
U.S. 249, 255 (1972).
20. 255 F. Supp. 555 (D. Md. 1965), modified, 66 A.M.C. 2275 (1966).
21. 255 F. Supp at 558.
22. 385 F.2d at 965. See, e.g., The Admiral Peoples, 295 U.S. 649 (1935) (ad-
miralty jurisdiction upheld over a case where the plaintiff stumbled upon a faulty gang-
plank negligently maintained by the defendant shipowner). The place where the in-
juries were fortuitously consummated-on land, i.e., the pier-was considered irrele-
vant, since the negligent act had affected the plaintiff through an appendage of the ves-
sel. Id. at 651-52.
23. 385 F.2d at 966.
24. See 409 U.S. 249, 256 n.5 where cases following the literal application of the
Vol. 1974:757]
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in addition to locality in order -to sustain admiralty jurisdiction and that
swimming did not provide such a maritime connection.
A careful analysis of the ways in which the courts have treated
the two elements of locality" and "maritime connection" in the ad-
miralty jurisdiction test, however, reveals the problems inherent in its
application and the prevailing lack of certainty about just what the ju-
risdictional rule is. Unfortunately, the recent jurisdictional develop-
ments have neither dispelled this uncertainty nor given rise to a well-
defined jurisdictional rule. The Chapman court clearly considered the
rule to be a test involving "locality plus." The court stated:
While the locality alone test should properly be used to exclude from
admiralty courts those cases in which the tort giving rise to the lawsuit
occurred on land rather than on some navigable body of water, it is
here determined that jurisdiction may not be based solely on the local-
ity criterion.2 5
Despite the court's skepticism that a maritime nexus ever existed in
the case, the court did specifically reach the locality issue and thus
adhered to a procedural view of the jurisidctional rule which would
require a determination of both the locality of the tort and the mari-
time relationship. A martime locality was found largely because the
conduct of the plaintiff had been voluntarily and intentionally related
to a navigable body of water.26  "Voluntariness," however, is scarcely
a definitive concept, since what one intends and what is fortuitous are
not always separable or distinguishable. Having determined that a
maritime locality existed, however, the court was further unclear as
to what the functional requirements of a maritime relationship might
be, and thus merely stated that "[a] relationship must exist between
the wrong and some maritime service, navigation or commerce on nav-
igable waters."'2r Exactly which aspects of the lawsuit must be so re-
lated was not clarified. Yet the possibilities are numerous-for ex-
ample, must the defendant or the negligent act or acts which he com-
mits be associated with traditional maritime concerns and be causally
related to the plaintiff, or must the plaintiff be involved in maritime
activities, or both? Must the type of injury received, once locality is
satisfied, also be one which is normally associated with maritime mat-
locality rule are collected by the Supreme Court. "In cases such as these, some courts
have adhered to a strict locality rule and have sustained admiralty jurisdiction despite
the lack of any connection between the wrong and traditional forms of maritime com-
merce or navigation." Id. at 255-56.
25. 385 F.2d at 966.
26. Id. at 965.
27. Id. at 966.
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ters? In short, though the holding of the case was clear in its result,
the only clear resolution of the rule's content concerned the fact that
locality may be used as an exclusionary factor in the jurisdictional test.
Ironically, even this aspect of the test has currently been eroded.
The clear division of the jurisdictional rule by the Chapman court
into two stages, locality and maritime nexus, and the cour's explana-
tion, however brief, that the locality element is a necessary but not
an independently sufficient factor in the jurisdictional test is significant
in light of the earlier "maritime nexus" case upon which the Chapman
court relied even though it suggested an approach to the locality rule
slightly different from that used in Chapman. McGuire v. City of New
York28 presented a jurisdictional issue involving -a swimmer injured in
the shallow waters of a public bathing beach owned and operated by
the City of New York. The plaintiff injured her hand on a submerged
object in the waters of the beach and attempted to invoke admiralty
jurisdiction. The court seemingly advocated ,an approach to -the local-
ity rule similar to that charted by the Chapman court, stating that the
fact that a tort "may have occurred on navigable waters is merely a
prima facie test of admiralty jurisdiction,"29  and that the 'locality test
"was developed as a rule of limitation, as a means of limiting the scope
of admiralty jurisdiction."30  However, rather -than deciding whether
the case could be excluded on the basis of the ,locality issue alone,
the court argued that it could justifiably ignore the locality question
altogether, 31 since the case could be entirely settled by finding 'the ab-
sence of a "maritime wrong." 2  Citing -a nineteenth century English
case for its fundamental approach,3 3 the court argued:
You have to consider three things-the locality, the subject matter of
the complaint, and the person with regard to whom the complaint is
made. You must consider all these things in determining whether the
28. 192 F. Supp. 866 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
29. Id. at 870.
30. Id. at 869. The court's dissatisfaction with the locality test as a complete test
was based on the view that the locality test "is subject to the much more fundamental
objection that it refers, however imperfectly, to arbitrary locality rather than to the
real and practical relation with the business and commerce of the sea." Id. at 870,
quoting Black, supra note 1, at 274.
31. The court expressed doubt that the shallow waters of the beach were navigable
"in the ordinarily accepted sense of the word." 192 F. Supp. at 867. This differs from
the procedure employed by the Chapman court, which proceeded to rule on locality
before determining maritime nexus, even though, as in McGuire, the court felt that no
maritime nexus existed.
32. "The basis for admiralty jurisdiction must be a combination of a maritime
wrong and a maritime location." Id. at 868.
33. The Queen v. Judge of the City of London Court, [1892] 1 Q.B. 273.
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Admiralty court has jurisdiction .... But, if any of the three matters
is wanting, the Admiralty court may not have jurisdiction.3 4
Focusing upon the nature of subject matter of the complaint, the court
considered whether the tort in the case involved any conventional
maritime element.3 5 In attempting to state some organizing principle
for the application of admiralty law, the court stated that "[a]dmiralty
law is, in fact the law of commerce,"3 and that "[tihe proper scope
of jurisdiction should include all matters relating to the business of -the
sea and the business conducted on navigable waters. '3 7 The libel con-
cerned in the case did not, in the court's opinion, "relate to any tort
which grows out of navigation, ' 3s and therefore failed.
At first glance the jurisdictional approaches in McGuire and
Chapman seem consistent. Both considered the rule to be one neces-
sitating "locality plus." Yet, as a method of applying the jurisdictional
rule, the Chapman court chose -to make a clear finding of locality be-
fore proceeding to evaluate the maritime element in the case. On
the other hand, the McGuire court viewed the locality test as a "rule
of limitation" and clearly relegated it to secondary importance by mov-
ing immediately to consider the substantive element of ,the action-
the maritime relationship. Moreover, the courts differ on their un-
derstanding of what constitutes a maritime relationship: The McGuire
court employed a test that described the "involvement" of a martime
matter in vague, but limited, terms of whether or not a conventional
maritime agency either caused the alleged harm or was harmed. The
34. 192 F. Supp. at 867.
35. "A maritime wrong generally has been concluded to be one which in some way
is involved in shipping or commerce." Id. at 868-69. The maritime matters described
by the court predominantly included instrumentalities of maritime activity or commerce,
in particular vessels or conventional maritime instrumentalities in tort cases. Id. at
870.
The court viewed with approval Professor Black's suggestion that the jurisdictional
rule should therefore cover:
(1) In contract, all those cases involving the enforcement, policing, or ad-
justment of business arrangements as a practical matter primarily concerned
with sea, lake, and river transport.
(2) In tort, all those cases seeking relief for tortious conduct with respect to
the subject matter of (1), or for injuries by or to vessels or other maritime
objects, or injuries to persons taking place in connection with the conduct of
the business of shipping. Id., quoting Black, supra note 1, at 274.
The court also showed deference to other authorities which tended to describe the
maritime character of a cause of action in terms of the involvement of vessels or
navigation. 192 F. Supp. at 871, citing G. RonyNSoN, ADMIALTY, §§ 8-9 (1939); 1
E. BENEDICT, ADMIRALTY § 61 (6th ed. 1940).
36. 192 F. Supp. at 871.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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court rather obtusely suggested that the rule should only embrace in-
juries to persons taking place "in connection with the conduct of the
business of shipping,"3 9 which could possibly include maritime agen-
cies other than vessels if they in fact had caused the injury. In short,
the focus of the court's test was upon the identification of some argu-
ably maritime cause of the injury, and the strong suggestion is that
this should be accomplished by a rather strict analogy to maritime
instrumentalities engaged in maritime business. This test, while un-
clear, is certainly narrower than that announced in Chapman. Spe-
cifically, McGuire entails that the "maritime nexus" or "maritime rela-
tionship" does not embrace a "totality of circumstances" test and thus
could not ever result in the exclusion of a "non-maritime" plaintiff
from admiralty jurisdiction, so long as a maritime agency such as a
vessel caused his injury. This implies -that jurisdiction must be denied
only if the defendant is not sufficiently identified with a maritime ac-
tivity in the traditional sense, and it therefore suggests that -the real
meaning of the relationship or nexus requirement concerns the estab-
lishment of a chain of injury-producing causation running from a mari-
time defendant to the plaintiff. The establishment of a causal connec-
tion between a maritime defendant and any plaintiff would 'likely sat-
isfy the instrumentality itest of McGuire. To this extent the functional
aspects of the maritime relationship or nexus test are stated with a
greater degree of specificity in McGuire than in Chapman, -though the
results in the two cases are adequately reconcilable.
Thus, even before Executive Jet, different aspects of a new rule
were emerging. These various aspects served to establish the signifi-
cance locality would assume in that new rule and, more importantly,
helped to define the approach to be used in determining whether the
required maritime relationship exists. Whether the maritime nexus
rule is essentially a rule focusing on the defendant, as opposed to an
exclusionary -rule applied to non-maritime plaintiffs, was emerging as
a question which logically would come to play an important part in
determining the extent -to which the new jurisdictional test satisfies the
objective of associating admiralty jurisdiction with "true" maritime
matters and the extent to which it is consistent with the substantive
principles of admiralty law. Furthermore, the clarity of -the emerging
rule was being clouded by variations in the application of 'the locality
requirement-whether it is (1) a determination to be made first, re-
gardless of any apparent presence or absence of maritime nexus, (2)
to be ignored if maritime nexus is doubtful, or (3) ,to be decided only
39. Id. at 870, quoting Black, supra note 1, at 274.
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if the nexus does exist. Nevertheless, before Executive Jet, the
emerging rule had not been vast into functional terminology, and the
importance of these functional issues in the jurisdictional rule had un-
fortumately remained -a neglected aspect of the gradual process of aban-
doning the old test of strict locality.
Executive Jet: FORMULATION OF THE NEW RULE
Despite these deficiencies in the emerging new jurisdictional rule,
the Supreme Court in Executive Jet did not adequately address itself
to the failure of the previous definitions to structure a jurisdictional
rule which reflects the concepts and functions of maritime enterprise.
In Executive Jet an airplane ingested some seagulls into its jet
engines while attempting to take off from a Cleveland 'airport. The
plane had been cleared for ,takeoff by the traffic controller but, due
to the ingestion of the birds, almost completely lost power and at-
tempted -to return to the airfield. But the plane veered off course
and struck an airport perimeter fence and a parked truck, finally set-
fling into the nearby waters of Lake Erie about a fifth of a statute
mile off shore. The aircraft owners, asserting admiralty jurisdiction,
sued the air -traffic controller, the City of Cleveland as owner and oper-
ator of the airport, and the airport manager.4
Each of -the courts -treated these -facts differently. The district
court, relying principally on Chapman, held that the rule was "locality
plus" rather than the traditional locality rule. The court's definition
of the rule required a determination that the location of the tort was
on navigable waters, as well as "a relationship between the wrong and
some maritime service, navigation or commerce on navigable wa-
ters."'41 The district court felt that neither criterion was satisfied and,
similar to the Chapman court (which it purported to follow), made
findings on both locality and maritime relationship. The court used a
traditional test to determine locality, focusing upon the place at which
the negligence became effective or "operative" upon the plaintiff,2
as opposed to the place where the injury was consummated.43 In this
40. 409 U.S. at 250-51.
41. Id. at 251.
42. The court found that
the alleged negligence became operative upon the aircraft while it was over
the land; and in this sense the "impact" of the alleged negligence occurred
when the gulls disabled the plane's engines [over the land] . . . . From this
point on the plane was disabled and was caused to fall. Whether it came
down upon land or upon water was largely fortuitious. Id. at 251-52.
43. The various locality tests are thoroughly discussed in Thompson v. Chesapeake
Yacht Club, Inc., 255 F. Supp. 555 (D. Md. 1965). Generally, the various tests are
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case the place of the "operative effect" was over land, where the birds
were ingested. The court then went on to conclude that the wrong
here bore no relationship to maritime matters.44 Despite the fact that
neither the locality nor maritime relationship requirements were satis-
as follows. Early in its history the Supreme Court had adopted a practical approach
similar to the classical situs rule regarding negligent injuries, a rule which focused upon
the place where the injury was consummated. The Plymouth, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20
(1865). In this case, admiralty jurisdiction was denied over a vessel from which a
fire had spread, causing shoreside damages. This particular test, mechanically applied,
was carried into the twentieth century and produced some unsatisfactory results in "bor-
derline cases." See T. Smith & Son v. Taylor, 276 U.S. 179 (1928), where ad-
miralty jurisdiction was denied when a longshoreman standing on a pier was struck by
a cargo sling and knocked into the water. In a somewhat reverse situation, jurisdiction
was sustained where a longshoreman working on the deck of a vessel was struck by
a hoist and knocked onto a pier. Minnie v. Port Huron Terminal Co., 295 U.S. 647
(1935). Dissatisfaction with the literal application of this test led some courts to hold
the place where the negligence had its full effect on the plaintiff to be more important
than the place where an impact or injury originated. See The Strabo, 98 F. 998 (2d
Cir. 1900). In The Admiral Peoples, 295 U.S. 649 (1935), a disembarking plaintiff
who tripped on a defective gangplank and fell upon a pier was held within admiralty
jurisdiction, since the actual place of the consummation of the injury was fortuitous.
However, other modifications of the rule occurred in special cases where the occurrence
of the injury upon navigable waters conferred admiralty jurisdiction under some specific
statutory grant, despite the fact that the negligence became operative on a plaintiff on
the shore and merely resulted in some final impact on navigable waters. See Interlake
S.S. Co. v. Nielson, 338 F.2d 879 (6th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965),
where a shipkeeper drove his car off the end of a dock into the frozen waters of Lake
Erie, resulting in a fatal crash. Jurisdiction was upheld despite the land based origin
of the negligence, since the coverage of the compensation statute, the Longshoremen's
and Harbor Workers' Act, 33 U.S.C. § 903(a) (1970), covered cases where the final
impact was on navigable waters. In aircraft cases not based upon any federal statute,
in which the plane crashed in navigable waters, the circumstances of the cases usually
made it impossible to determine where the real act of negligence became operative on
the plane, so the courts adopted "a practical approach" by generally affixing situs at
the place where the plane crashed. See Weinstein v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 316 F.2d
758 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 940 (1963); Thompson v. Chesapeake Yacht Club,
Inc., 255 F. Supp. 555, 558 (D. Md. 1965). The Thompson case involved a plaintiff
who fell through a hole in the pier at his yacht club into the navigable waters beneath the
pier. The court here, using an approach similar to that of The Admiral Peoples but with
different result, opted for the place where the negligent act "became operative" upon
the plaintiff-the pier-rather than the place of his ultimate injury in the water. The
court denied jurisdiction over the action on the basis of this locality test, but upheld ju-
risdiction over an amended complaint which alleged the defendant's breach of warranty
to provide a safe berth for his vessel. See id. at 559. For a discussion of the evolving
jurisdictional rules confined mainly to concepts of locality, see Note, Admiralty-uris-
diction Over Airplane Crashes in Navigable Waters, 18 WAYNE L. REV. 1569 (1972).
See also Leising, Admiralty, Aviation Tort Claims, Relationship to Traditional Maritime
Activity Required for Admiralty Jurisdiction, 47 TuL. L. Rv. 1143-45 (1973).
44. "Assuming . . . that air commerce bears some relationship to maritime com-
merce when the former is carried out over navigable waters, the relevant circumstances
here were unconnected with the maritime facets of air commerce." Quoted in 409 U.S.
at 252.
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fied, the court made separate findings on both issues, indicating that
the finding of either might give rise to admiralty jurisdiction. But the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed on the locality point alone, hold-
ing that the tort occurred over land, and that it was unnecessary to con-
sider the maritime relationship requirement.
45
When the case came before the Supreme Court, the Court was
faced with the task of reviewing departures from the historical rules
undertaken by both the lower courts. 48  The fundamental question
was, should the test be more than mere locality? Rather than make
a determination on both locality and maritime relationship, as the dis-
trict court had done, or approach locality as a threshold question, a
negative answer to which would preclude the maritime relationship
question, as the court of appeals had done, the Court moved directly
to consider the maritime nexus question. In doing so, instead of pro-
viding a clear jurisdictional rule, the Court simply made the role of
locality in the new test ambiguous. For example, the Court proceeded
by describing situations where the old locality rule produced "absurd"
and inconsistent results. The Court took some pains to document the
seemingly irrational treatment of different plaintiffs whose maritime
status or importance was virtually identical but who received different
jurisdictional treatment based on strictly spatial considerations.41 After
citing Chapman with approval, which might have indicated an approval
of the Chapman approach to the application of the jurisdictional
rule,48 the Supreme Court proceeded to decide the Executive Jet con-
troversy in a manner which gave little guidance concerning how to ap-
ply the various aspects of the test to different fact situations. The
Supreme Court averred that it had never really "explicitly held" that
the maritime locality requirement was the sole test of admiralty ju-
risdiction, implying that the test could be made to include some addi-
tional requirement without doing violence to the old concept. 40  As
further evidence of the Court's dissatisfaction with the often irrational
results produced by the old locality rule, it mentioned other areas
where the maritime significance of a particular subject matter had
45. Id.
46. The district court had turned to the "locality plus" formulation of the rule; the
court of appeals had rejected the rule of convenience traditionally accepted in deter-
mining the location of the tort in aircraft accident cases.
47. See 409 U.S. at 254. The court compares T. Smith & Son v. Taylor, 276
U.S. 179 (1928), with Minnie v. Port Huron Terminal Co., 295 U.S. 647 (1935). See
note 43 supra.
48. 409 U.S. at 256. See Onley v. South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co., 488 F.2d 758,
760 (4th Cir. 1973).
49. 409 U.S. at 258.
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persuaded Congress to bestow admiralty jurisdiction on the federal
courts in cases where the locality requirement was clearly unsatisfied. 50
However, the Court did not clarify the way in which some additional
requirement might be applied. In fact the language of the Court at
one point might be read as indicating that the maritime nexus test
should stand in lieu of the locality test in certain instances. Specifically,
the Court stated:
In sum, there had existed over the years a judicial, legislative, and
scholarly recognition that, in determining whether there is admiralty ju-
risdiction over a particular tort or class of torts, reliance on the rela-
tionship of the wrong to traditional maritime activity is often more sen-
sible and more consonant with the purpose of maritime law than is a
purely mechanical application of the locality test.51
However, throughout its opinion the Court also speaks of problems
with the "locality alone" test,52 suggesting that some role for locality
is retained, but with an additional requirement of maritime nexus.
Unfortunately, the Court's resolution of the case leaves the role of lo-
cality undefined, for it considered the conflicting interpretations of the
locality of the tort urged by the litigants53 but decided that in the ab-
sence of a maritime nexus in aircraft accidents of this sort it was un-
necessary to decide the locality question at all." The Court stated
that the mere fact that the alleged wrong "occurs" or "is located" on
or over navigable waters-whatever that means in an aviation context
-is not itself sufficient to turn an airplane negligence case into a
"maritime tort." 5  It is far more consistent with the history and pur-
pose of admiralty to require also that the wrong bear a "significant
relationship to traditional maritime activity. '56 This language, coupled
50. Id. at 259-60. The Court here referred to the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688
(1970), which allowed admiralty jurisdiction over land-based injuries to seamen. The
Court also discussed traditional admiralty law doctrines covering land-based injuries,
such as unseaworthiness and maintenance and cure. The former extended to shoreside
injuries caused to longshoremen stemming from defects in a ship or its gear and the
latter covered seamen wherever they might go. Also the Extension of Admiralty Juris-
diction Act, 46 U.S.C § 740 (1970), providing admiralty jurisdiction for damages to
shore property caused by vessels on navigable waters, evidenced concern for rationally
associating the imposition of admiralty power with the acts of a truly maritime agency.
51. 409 U.S. at 261.
52. Id. at 265-68.
53. Id. at 267.
54. "In the view we take of the question before us, we need not decide who has
the better of the dispute. It is enough to note that either position gives rise to the
problems inherent in applying the strict locality test of admiralty tort jurisdiction in
aviation accident cases." Id.
55. Id. at 268.
56. Id.
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with the reliance on Chapman and the continuous references to the
"locality alone" test or locality as the "sole test," would seem to imply
that the Court attempted to create a "locality plus" test, rather than
an outright abandonment of the locality test. The application of the
new rule, however, did not in the Court's opinion necessitate a finding
of locality where the required maritime nexus was absent. Thus, the
locality question would only be reached as a further exclusionary test
if the threshold maritime nexus were present.
Confronting the question whether a nexus existed between the
libel and a maritime activity, the Court concluded that no nexus could
be sustained where interstate flights, beginning and ending within the
continental United States, bear no significant relationship to maritime
travel or other maritime activity.57 The Court then focused upon the
nature of the plaintiff involved in the suit and concluded that the plain-
tiff was not sufficiently connected to any maritime activity to justify
the assertion of jurisdiction.
Although the Supreme Court and many observers believe that the
result of Executive Jet may have sensibly avoided -the application
of admiralty law to an intracontinental aviation accident, the method
used for disposing of the case has resulted in much confusion about
the vitality of the locality rule and its precedence in application, if it
is still a part of the test at all. Indeed, it has been held by at least
one court that there has been no change from the strict locality rule
at all, save in aircraft accident cases.58 The courts following Executive
Jet have also not exhibited a uniform acceptance of the functional
analysis utilized by the Supreme Court to establish the nature and
function of the plaintiff and the injury-causing activity.
THE PosT-Executive Jet OPINIONS: PROBLEMS WITH THE
RULE AS APPLIED
In attempting to articulate the defeots in the Executive Jet mode
of jurisdictional decision, as well as in attempting to formulate a work-
able alternative, several of the principal post-Executive Jet decisions
will be reviewed to illustrate again that the jurisdictional rule after Ex-
ecutive Jet may still be the subject of much confusion among the fed-
57. After assessing possible comparisons between the condition of a plane or its
passengers in cases where the plane has crashed at sea, the Court was persuaded that
the differences between airplane travel and travel by a conventional vessel outweighed
such similarities, and the different sources and concepts of regulation in the two areas
militated against equating these methods of travel. Id. at 269.
58. Watson v. D/S A/S Idaho, 359 F. Supp. 496, 499 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
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eral courts. The rule has not proved to be the least bit lucid, and
district court judges on occasion have been forced -to request counsel
to submit briefs just to determine the effect of Executive Jet upon
a case which would otherwise have been treated without hesitation un-
der admiralty jurisdiction. 9 A critical look at the lower court deci-
sions following Executive Jet will illustrate the various molds
into which the new rule may be cast and will hopefully also illuminate
an organizing principle which will assist in defining a rule which can
be effectively applied to all cases without incongruous results.
The possible rules generated by Executive Jet include the follow-
ing: (1) The old locality rule prevails as -always except in specifically
excepted areas, such as aircraft accidents.60 (2) The old locality rule
prevails as always except in the specifically exempted areas and in
cases sufficiently similar to exempted areas, e.g., aircraft accidents
arising in intracontinental flights, and not satisfactorily capable of res-
olution by the mechanical operation of the traditional locality rule.01
(3) The locality test has been flatly rejected, leaving the finding of
a sufficient maritime nexus as the only relevant criterion for admiralty
jurisdiction."' (4) The test demands a finding of both locality and
a maritime nexus, the failure to find either being capable of defeating
the jurisdiction. 3  Under one formulation of this test the court may
59. Oppen v. Aetna Ins. Co., 485 F.2d 252 (9th Cir. 1973).
60. See, e.g., Earles v. Union Barge Line Corp., 486 F.2d 1097 (3d Cir. 1973);
Watson v. D/S A/S Idaho, 359 F. Supp. 496 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Maryland v. Amerada
Hess Corp., 356 F. Supp. 975 (D. Md. 1973); cf. Higginbotham v. Mobil Oil Corp.,
357 F. Supp. 1164 (W.D. La. 1973). Contra, Onley v. South Carolina Elec. & Gas
Co., 488 F.2d 758, 759 n.1 (4th Cir. 1973); Rubin v. Power Authority, 356 F. Supp.
1169 (W.D.N.Y. 1973).
61. See, e.g., Crosson v. Vance, 484 F.2d 840 (4th Cir. 1973); cf. Hark v. Antilles
Airboats, Inc., 355 F. Supp. 683 (D.V.I. 1973).
62. Despite a finding that an injury occurred on the land or an extension thereof,
some courts have pursued the possibility that a maritime nexus would establish admir-
alty jurisdiction under Executive Jet. See, e.g., Powers v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 477
F.2d 643 (1st Cir. 1973); Jiles v. Federal Barge Lines, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1225 (E.D.
La. 1973). Others make outright assertions that the Supreme Court has "rejected the
'maritime locality' test in favor of the significant relationship test." Teachy v. United
States, 363 F. Supp. 1197, 1198 n.2 (M.D. Fla. 1973); cf. Sandoval v. Victory Carriers,
Inc., 354 F. Supp. 996, 997 n.1 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Adams v. Montana Power Co., 354
F. Supp. 1111 (D. Mont. 1973). See generally Kelly v. Smith, 485 F.2d 520 (5th Cir.
1973), noted in 52 TEx. L. REv. 114 (1973).
63. See Onley v. South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co., 488 F.2d 758 (4th Cir. 1973);
Oppen v. Aetna Ins. Co., 485 F.2d 252 (9th Cir. 1973); Luna v. Star of India, 356
F. Supp. 59 (S.D. Cal. 1973); cf. Higginbotham v. Mobil Oil Corp., 357 F. Supp. 1164
(W.D. La. 1973). See also Moye v. Henderson, No. 73-1871 (8th Cir., filed May 8,
1974). In Moye the district court made a finding of both locality and maritime nexus,
but the court of appeal's opinion is ambiguous as to the proper procedural sequence.
See id. at 6.
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deny jurisdiction after finding on only one issue, if the case should
fail to satisfy that criterion;64 under another formulation of the test,
the court would be required to find on both issues in an effort to per-
ceive and judge the case as a composite whole. 6r
Further conceptual variations can exist within the finding of a
maritime nexus itself: (a) The nexus may hinge upon a critical evalua-
tion of all the characteristics of the action, for example, the nature of
the plaintiff, 66 the nature of the defendant,67 the activity producing
the injuries, and the instrumentality causing the .tort.6 8  Under this un-
derstanding of the maritime nexus, all aspects of the action must be
sufficiently associated with a traditional maritime activity in order for
the court to have jurisdiction in admiralty. (b) The nexus may de-
pend upon the existence of one or more specifically emphasized char-
acteristics or relationships in the causal chain which produced the in-
jury.69 Thus a finding that the defendant was engaged in a traditional
maritime activity,7 ° or that the instrumentality through which the injury
was effectuated was a vessel, 71 or that the action of the plaintiff was
that of a traditional function of a seaman, 72 would independently sup-
port the finding of an adequate maritime nexus for jurisdictional pur-
poses regardless of the non-maritime nature of any other aspects of
the action. Here, the only connection or "nexus" required would be
causation arising from a specified maritime aspect of the action; the
maritime aspects could be defined by concrete rules. For example,
a maritime defendant may be defined as either a classical maritime
agency such as a vessel or its gear, or something closely analogous
to it.
Virtually without exception, each of these possible formulations
of the tests for maritime jurisdiction with the related variables
64. See Watson v. D/S A/S Idaho, 359 F. Supp. 496 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
65. See Jiles v. Federal Barge Lines, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1225 (E.D. La. 1973);
Hark v. Antilles Airboats, Inc., 355 F. Supp. 683 (D.V.I. 1973).
66. See Oppen v. Aetna Ins. Co., 485 F.2d 252 (9th Cir. 1973); Powers v. Bethle-
hem Steel Corp., 477 F.2d 643, 648 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 856 (1973); On-
ley v. South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co., Civil No. 72-1455 (D.S.C., filed Mar. 5, 1973).
67. See Higginbotham v. Mobil Oil Corp., 357 F. Supp. 1164 (W.D. La. 1973).
68. See Maryland v. Amerada Hess Corp., 356 F. Supp. 975 (D. Md. 1973); Rubin
v. Power Authority, 356 F. Supp. 1169 (W.D.N.Y. 1973); cf. Onley v. South Carolina
Elec. & Gas Co., 488 F.2d 758, 760 (4th Cir. 1973).
69. See Chapman v. City of Grosse Pointe Farms, 385 F.2d 962 (6th Cir. 1967);
Jiles v. Federal Barge Lines, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1225 (E.D. La. 1973).
70. See Higginbotham v. Mobil Oil Corp., 357 F. Supp. 1164 (W.D. La. 1973).
71. See Luna v. Star of India, 356 F. Supp. 59 (S.D. Cal. 1973); cf. Rubin v.
Power Authority, 356 F. Supp. 1169, 1171 n.1 (W.D.N.Y. 1973).
72. See Ross v. Mobil Oil Corp., 474 F.2d 989 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1012 (1973).
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has found some degree of acceptance in the lower courts since the
opinion in Executive Jet was announced. Nevertheless, the results of
the decisions themselves are not always objectionable but rather most
often represent rational judicial manipulation designed to achieve rea-
sonable results in some difficult borderline cases. The fact that the
case law itself can often achieve a degree of rationality in spite of the
ambiguities and indeterminancies of the leading opinion indicates the
possible existence of an inchoate but more fundamental jurisdictional
rule than that which is expressed by Executive Jet.
The Simplest Interpretation
The first and simplest interpretation of the new rule consists of
the minimal holding that the Supreme Court has altered the law of
admiralty jurisdiction only to the extent of excluding airplanes crash-
ing into the water from its purview. Under this interpretation, the
conventional maritime law remains intact after the Executive Jet deci-
sion minus this one minor exclusion. Thus one court has explained:
The Supreme Court did not expand admiralty jurisdiction. . . but
Executive Jet further restricted it in regard to aviation tort cases. The
Court referred with approval to the locality test, when dealing with
ships in traditional maritime situations.73
Similarly in Maryland v. Amerada Hess Corp.,74 the court stated that
Executive Jet "did not reject the locality test for jurisdiction in ad-
miralty cases, but merely held it to be insufficient in claims arising
from airplane accidents."75  In Amerada Hess, the court asserted ad-
miralty jurisdiction over a case involving a suit by the State of Mary-
land seeking damages for an oil spill caused by a rupture of an oil
transfer line between the defendant's vessel and co-defendant's plant.
However, in explaining its action, the court offered only very general
guidelines as to the operation of the jurisdictional rule -as it perceived
it to be. Confident that the old test had been rejected by the Supreme
Court in the case of aircraft accidents because they were "borderline
cases," where the application of a strict locality rule produced results
which were "absurd" and bore no relationship to the effectuation of
definable policies of admiralty law, the court sustained jurisdiction be-
cause the case was "not a 'perverse' or 'casuistic borderline situation'
73. Watson v. D/S A/S Idaho, 359 F. Supp. 496, 499 (E.D. Pa. 1973); cI. Victory
Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202 (1971), where the Court stated, "At least in the
absence of explicit congressional authorization we shall not extend the historic bounda-
ries of the maritime law." Id. at 214.
74. 356 F. Supp. 975 (D. Md. 1973).
75. Id. at 976.
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that would require deviation from -the application of the traditional lo-
cality test."17 6
Rather than analytically approaching the reasons why this case
was not borderline in terms of some process of evaluating the rational
connection between the defendant or his activities and traditional, anal-
ogous maritime matters or recognizable substantive admiralty law con-
siderations, the court completely ignored the value of functional defini-
tion and announced the fact that this case was neither ambiguous nor
"borderline." The court's approach apparently assumed that "border-
line" cases can be readily separated from the "non-borderline ones."
The non-borderline cases are those in which imposition of the locality
test is not patently "absurd," which is to say that the jurisdiction is
appropriate where the results of the application of the jurisdictional
test do not include within admiralty jurisdiction matters not reasonably
associated with maritime law or policy. Thus the court tacitly admit-
ted that the jurisdictional trend evidenced by Executive Jet was based
upon certain rational principles, which the court simply found unneces-
sary to define with specificity. The court assumed that locality was
rejected in Executive Jet simply because that was a hard case, but
that locality should continue to govern in the present case which was
easy. Judged by -almost any standard of a good jurisdictional rule, es-
pecially the policy of minimizing litigation concerning jurisdictional
principles, a less predictable approach than the "easy/hard" test could
hardly be imagined.
Maritime Nexus as Sole Justification
Other cases effectively hold that the Supreme Court has baldly
rejected the locality test and substituted in its place the finding of a
maritime nexus as the sole justification for sustaining admiralty juris-
diction. For example, in Jiles v. Federal Barge Lines, Inc.,77 the court
found the absence of a maritime locality when a painter fell and was
injured while working on an old steamboat which had been perma-
nently docked and converted into "an extension of the land. ' 78 Despite
the indisputable lack of maritime locality, the court nevertheless looked
for a connection between the tort and maritime activities. Only after
the court was satisfied that not enough significant elements of ad-
miralty interest existed in the case did it refuse to grant admiralty
76. Id. at 977.
77. 365 F. Supp. 1225 (E.D. La. 1973).
78. Id. at 1227.
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jurisdiction over the action. 79  Likewise in Teachy v. United States, 0
the court asserted that Executive Jet had unequivocally "rejected the
'maritime locality' test in favor of the significant relationship test."'s
Thus, regardless of where a Coast Guard helicopter crashed after it
brought persons rescued from a sinking shrimp boat to land, admiralty
jurisdiction could not attach if the helicopter was no longer performing
a function traditionally performed by a seaborne vessel.82
The case of Sandoval v. Victory Carriers, Inc."3 is another ex-
ample of the application of the strict "nexus" approach after Executive
Jet. A longshoreman was struck by a piece of lumber which fell from
a sling during a loading operation. The fall of -the lumber was caused
by the fact that the winch operator hoisting the lumber aboard had
raised a bundle of lumber too fast, causing it to strike another bundle
and become tilted. One of the boards in -the bundle dislodged and
fell upon the plaintiff-longshoreman. The plaintiff sued the ship
owner and operator on the grounds of unseaworthiness and negli-
gence. In denying the defendant's motion for summary judgment, the
court concluded that there was sufficient evidence of possible defect
in the winch itself, and that failure to remedy the defect may have
amounted to negligence on -the part of the defendant.8 4 The court was
persuaded that the policy underlying the Extension of Admiralty Ju-
risdsiction Act, 5 removing the locality barrier to asserting admiralty
jurisdiction over shore-damage caused by vessels, coupled with the
fact that the pleadings alleged unseaworthiness of the vessel qua neg-
ligence,8 6 was sufficient to uphold jurisdiction. Earlier cases had so
held.87  Given this policy basis and this alleged maritime question of
fact, the court explained:
79. Id. at 1228-29.
80. 363 F. Supp. 1197 (M.D. Fla. 1973).
81. Id. at 1198 n.2.
82. id. at 1199. The helicopter had completed the "performance of a function tra-
ditionally performed by waterborne vessels (i.e., the performance of search and rescue
operations)" when it landed to refuel at Key West, Florida. Id. The decedent was
killed on the second leg of the trip--Key West to St. Petersburg.
83. 354 F. Supp. 996 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
84. Id. at 1000.
85. 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1970).
86. A recent amendment to the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensa-
tion Act has affected the substantive basis for actions by longshoremen against vessels,
as well as the traditional "remedy-over" by vessel owners against stevedores. See 33
U.S.C. § 905(b) (Supp. I, 1972), amending 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1970). For the legisla-
tive history of amendment to the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act, see 3 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4701-05 (1972).
87. See, e.g., Gutierrez v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 373 U.S. 206 (1963).
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[Executive Jet] did not diminish the admiralty jurisdiction in the case
I even though the relationship of the wrong to traditional maritime
activity test were to be used instead of the Extension Act. 8
Hence, a simple finding of an identifiable maritime policy regarding
the alleged responsibility of this defendant was sufficient to find a mari-
time nexus and admiralty jurisdiction with or without the precedent
of Executive Jet. Consequently, no finding of locality was made nec-
essary in the opinion of the court, a decision which appears to be emi-
nently reasonable to these authors.
Although the form of these decisions is sometimes confusing,
other courts have used similar processes to resolve jurisdictional ques-
tions. In Powers v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,9 -the plaintiff was engaged
in repair operations on a pier and sustained serious eye injuries caused
by an exploding light bulb as he was standing on a raft or float under
the pier on which he worked. Plaintiff collected for his injuries un-
der the Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act and
filed separate actions against his employer, who owned the raft, and
Bethlehem Steel Company, which owned the pier and which had con-
tracted with plaintiffs employer. The action against plaintiff's em-
ployer was based upon the Jones Act, as well as upon maintenance and
cure under general maritime law, and the action against Bethlehem
Steel was based upon negligence which the plaintiff claimed should be
determined under general maritime law. The action against the em-
ployer was founded upon alleged admiralty jurisdiction, and federal ju-
risdiction over Bethlehem rested upon diversity of citizenship; however,
the finding of admiralty jurisdiction would also have determined ,the ap-
plicable law in the diversity action. The court discussed the substantive
basis for a Jones Act claim, which required "affiliation with a 'vessel'
-either as a crew member or as one injured aboard doing seaman's
work."90 After discussion of the physical characteristics and operation
of the raft and its possible similarity to a conventional vessel used in
actual navigation, the court was able to exclude the raft from that defi-
nition.91  Thus the claim against plaintiffs employer had to fall, since
88. 354 F. Supp. at 997 n.1.
89. 477 F.2d 643 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 856 (1973).
90. Id. at 646.
91. 'The raft's only movement was from the pier front to the piles underneath or
from one row of piles to another. Even when so moving it was normally attached
by at least one line to the pier." Id. at 645 (footnote omitted). The raft itself was
made "of 12 by 12 timbers, bonded together," and the repair equipment would be low-
ered from the pier onto its surface. Further, the purpose of the raft in no way re-
sembled that of conventional vessels: 'The purpose and business of the present raft
was not the transportation of passengers, cargo, or equipment from place to place
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the substantive claims raised by the plaintiff required the cause of the
injury to be related to a "vessel."
Addressing the claim ,against Behlehem, which was rejected, the
court articulated its understanding of the jurisdictional rule in Execu-
tive Jet, which had to be satisfied in order for maritime law to apply:
Maritime law applies only where the wrong occurring on or over nav-
igable waters "bear[s] a significant relationship to traditional maritime
activity." . . . It would be incongruous to hold that the required rela-
tionship existed here, in the face of our conclusion that the raft was
not a vessel, but, being a floating work platform, was, in effect, an ex-
tension of the pier, itself an extension of the land.92
It might appear that the court was constrained to deny jurisdiction
on two grounds: under the locality test, the injury occurred on an ex-
tension of the land, and under the maritime nexus test, the injury was
not connected with a significant relationship to traditional maritime ac-
tivity. However, the rationale for determining the character of the
locality in effect coincided with the rationale for determining maritime
relationship, since both rested upon the finding that the repair raft was
not a vessel because it was almost always attached to the pier. The
locality and maritime nexus tests were -thus highly interrelated, if not
synonymous. Consequently, in its analysis of the question of admiralty
jurisdiction, the court -addressed itself fundamentally to an empirical,
factual evaluation of the propriety of a maritime designation of the
function which the raft was performing at the time the accident oc-
curred. In the view of the court the locality test itself is reduced to
a test of the maritime nexus or nature of the locality, which effectively
annihilates -the old locality rule in favor of a strict maritime nexus test.
Furthermore, having found that the raft was effectively an extension
of the land, the court nevertheless found it necessary to consider the
nature of the plaintiff's occupation and of -the circumstances of the ac-
cident in order to determine whether a maritime connection existed
which might entitle the plaintiff to invoke admiralty jurisdiction in the
case. Accordingly, when the court summarized the import of Execu-
tive Jet as reserving admiralty law for cases arising out of controversies
concerning vessels which "ply the waterways of the world," 93 the court
must be understood to be discounting the locality determination in
favor of a strict maritime function test based upon the finding of an
across navigable waters. It was tied to the pier or its pilings virtually all the time."
It was thus "indistinguishable from a permanent floating dock." Id. at 647.
92. Id. at 648.
93. Id.
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admiralty nexus between the injury incurred and the action out of
which the complaint arose.
The "Locality Plus" Test
Further cases clearly read Executive Jet ,as creating an equally
balanced dual test of "locality plus" for admiralty jurisdiction. In Op-
pen v. Aetna Insurance Co.,94 one of the cases arising out of the 1969
Santa Barbara oil spill, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals articulated
the requirements of the rule as follows: "[L]ocality alone is not suffi-
cient. We must also decide whether the wrong bears 'a significant
relationship to traditional maritime activity.' "95 The court found that
the right which the plaintiff sought to vindicate was of a maritime na-
ture and thus, despite the probable non-maritime nature of the defend-
ant's activity in causing the oil damage, admiralty law controlled the
substantive disposition of the case. 9
Also following a "locality plus" interpretation of Executive Jet,
but this time focusing on the maritime character of the defendant's
activities, is a passage in Higginbotham v. Mobil Oil Corp. Here
plaintiffs' decedents were a helicopter pilot and several workers on
an offshore oil rig owned by one of the defendants, Mobil Oil. The
decedents were killed when the helicopter carrying them from the rig
crashed offshore. Both Mobil and the manufacturer of the helicopter
were sued. The court denied relief against the manufacturer due to
the absence of any evidence indicating a design or manufacturing de-
fect. It permitted relief, however, against Mobil, the employer and
operator of the aircraft, under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. In
granting admiralty jurisdiction, the court found a maritime nexus by
analogizing the defendant's conduct and the circumstances of the ac-
cident to features associated with conventional maritime enterprise:
The accident occurred on high seas over the outer Continental
Shelf in the Gulf of Mexico far outside the boundaries of the State of
Louisiana, and thus satisfies the traditional locality test of jurisdiction
... . The fated helicopter was owned and operated by Mobil in con-
junction with its extensive offshore activities, and, at the time of the
fatal accident, was performing the ordinary functions of a crewboat.
Unquestionably it was engaged in maritime activity and was not oper-
94. 485 F.2d 252 (9th Cir. 1973).
95. Id. at 256. Here it was the plaintiff who was seeking to avoid the substantive
law of admiralty in order to enforce a state claim of nuisance against the defendants.
96. Id. at 257.
97. 357 F. Supp. 1164 (W.D. La. 1973). See also Teachy v. United States, 363
F. Supp. 1197 (M.D. Fla. 1973), discussed in notes 80-82 supra and accompanying text.
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ating as a "land-based aircraft between points within the continental
United States."98
Other cases have evidenced a preoccupation with the maritime
character of the defendant or his activities, classifying these either ac-
cording to traditional maritime definitions, or by analogy to traditional
maritime matters, and have thus tended to view even locality with
some flexibility. For example, in Luna v. Star of India,99 the court
applied the new jurisdictional rule to a case involving personal injuries
sustained aboard an antique sailing vessel, the Star of India, which was
permanently moored to a pier in San Diego and used as a maritime
museum. The plaintiff was a visitor to the Star and asserted a claim
in admiralty against the owners and operators of the vessel. Unlike
the court in Jiles v. Federal Barge Lines, Inc.,100 this court found no
initial difficulty with the locality, since "the Star was afloat on navi-
gable waters at the time in question."''1° Citing Chapman, the court,
however, acknowledged that Executive Jet should be interpreted to
mean that the jurisdictional rule is now a "locality plus' test. Although
the plaintiff argued that the decision in Executive Jet did not fore-
close the continued application of a strict locality rule in non-aviation
cases, the court was "greatly impressed by the soundness of reason-
ing to be found in the arguments of the critics of.the 'strict locality'
rule,"' 0 2 and proceeded to inquire whether a maritime nexus existed
within the facts of the case.103  In the face of the defendants' argu-
ment that the vessel was permanently ,affixed to the adjoining pier,
abrogating its ability to conduct any practical navigation or function
ordinarily performed by a vessel,'04 the court acknowledged a mar-
98. 357 F. Supp. at 1167 (emphasis added). See id. at 1174.
99. 356 F. Supp. 59 (S.D. Cal. 1973).
100. See notes 77-79 supra and accompanying text.
101. 356 F. Supp. at 61.
102. Id. at 62.
103. Id. at 63.
104. The defendant introduced findings by the U.S. Coast Guard made pursuant to
licensing and inspection practices which, as a basis for relieving the Star of these re-
quirements, stated that she was "'substantially a land structure' since it is established
that the moorings cannot be inadvertently or accidently [sic] cast off, that it would
not likely break its moorings, or that it could not be moved without special effort, such
as with the use of tools." Id. The Star also had electrical and water connections run-
ning from the shore.
Because of its emphasis on the need for a floating structure to be engaged in actual
navigation and to have a function that "requires exposure to the hazards of the sea,"
it seems likely the Powers court would have agreed with the defendant and denied ad-
miralty jurisdiction in this case. 477 F.2d at 647. See notes 89-93 supra and accom-
panying text.
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time nexus in an interesting and colorful analysis of the basic maritime
character of the Star as a vessel. The court stated that
it can fairly be said that visitors to the Star of India do not pay admis-
sion merely to view the memorabilia collected below in a few glass
cases, but they come aboard to enjoy the unique experience of trodding
the decks and inspecting the lofty rigging of this old sea voyager ...
• . . Were she presently slipped from her moorings, whether delib-
erately or by chance, she would undoubtedly be capable of engaging
in maritime transportation, if only as a towed craft. . . . We are re-
minded of the endeavors of men who dared to navigate oceans in far
less seaworthy craft.10 5
But why the permanence of the mooring, rendering the Star an exten-
sion of the land, did not preclude the finding of maritime locality was
not adequately explained by the court. Nevertheless, the court's con-
clusive determination of locality at the outset indicated that it con-
strued the test as requiring a separate finding on both locality and
maritime nexus.
Moreover, Luna v. Star of India is not the only decision which
has held that the designation of the presence of a "vessel" in the case
controls the finding of a maritime nexus. In Hark v. Antilles Airboats,
Inc.,10 6 it was noted that if location were still the sole test, a seaplane
takeoff accident occurring after the plane is airborne could be distin-
guished from an admiralty suit on the grounds that a seaplane, once
in the air, is not a vessel for purposes of substantive admiralty law.
But under the nexus rule as propounded by the Supreme Court in
Executive Jet, the court regarded itself bound to consider whether the
plane was serving the role of a vessel at the time of the accident,
105. 356 F. Supp. at 66.
106. 355 F. Supp. 683 (D.V.I. 1973). In order to avoid the expiration of the stat-
ute of limitations on his common law claim, the plaintiff asserted admiralty jurisdiction
over a claim for personal injuries arising from the crash of a seaplane on which the
plaintiff was a passenger. The seaplane crashed into navigable waters after attempting
to take off. The plane had reached an altitude of about 200 feet but had not attained
"minimum control speed." After analyzing previous cases which applied admiralty jur-
isdiction to seaplanes that had accidents while still on the water, and comparing the
present case with those involving the fall of land based planes into navigable waters,
the court concluded that the physical characteristics and practical considerations of sea-
plane flights, at least those over international waters or between territorial islands,
made such flights sufficiently maritime in order to meet the standards of the Executive
Jet test. Also, the court suggested that "[tihe 'marine' character of the venture also
persists for some distance after the plane has left the water and is no longer under
formal navigational rules." Id. at 686. The court interpreted Executive Jet to require
a test beyond locality, stating that the Supreme Court meant that "[i]n addition to a
maritime location, the tort must also have 'a significant relationship to traditional mari-
time activity.'" Id. at 685-86.
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thereby making the designation "vessel" itself of jurisdictional impor-
tance. 10 7  Likewise, Rubin v. Power Authority"'8 implies in dicta that
even if a maritime nexus is lacking, the involvement of a vessel in
causing the injury may be enough to sustain admiralty jurisdiction even
under Executive Jet.0 9 But to the contrary, other cases have firmly
held that the presence or absence of a vessel is now wholly irrelevant
to the jurisdicitional determination, 1" 0 especially if the plaintiff himself
is not engaged in some traditional activity of a seaman when his in-
107. Id. at 686 n.2. The court discussed the peculiarly maritime problems of take-
off and landing encountered by seaplanes, including the need to abide by maritime rules
of the road in cases of engine failure, and the possibility that take-off or landing waters
might be "fraught with flotsam or ligan or just plain pollution and erratic boaters and
snorkelers-all posing maritime dangers, not at all common to land based planes." Id.
at 686. Quoting Mr. Justice Stewart's comment in Executive Jet that international
flights performed "a function traditionally performed by waterborne vessels," id. at 687,
and citing the "especial conveniences" of an admiralty forum in cases involving activi-
ties not confined to a single nation, the court concluded that "the oar should be placed
on the bench, (an English tradition indicating that the judge is hearing an admiralty
case)" and so it was. Id. at 684, 686. Thus it appears that the court ascribed to the
"locality plus" interpretation of Executive Jet, coupled with a defendant-oriented anal-
ogy between the defendant's activities and maritime activities.
108. 356 F. Supp. 1169 (W.D.N.Y. 1973), where the representatives of divers
drowned in the water intakes of a generating plant owned by the defendant attempted
to assert admiralty jurisdiction. Citing language from Executive Jet, the court con-
cluded that "satisfaction of the locality test is insufficient to sustain admiralty jurisdic-
tion, and that it must also be shown that the tortious acts alleged in the complaints
bear 'a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity.'" Id. at 1171. The
court then analyzed the nature of defendant's activities in terms of the alleged wrong-
doing-the failure to erect barriers or warning signs or markers to prevent users of the
waters from being drawn into the intakes of the generating plant-and concluded that
these activities did not correlate with "maritime service, navigation or commerce,"
which were historically the basis for asserting admiralty jurisdiction, and thus denied
jurisdiction.
109. Id. at 1171 n.1. Compare Judge Benedict's "celebrated doubt" as to whether
admiralty jurisdiction did not essentially depend upon some "relation of the parties to
a ship or vessel." E. BENEDICT, THE AMERICAN ADMIRALTY 173 (1850), cited in Exec-
utive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 257 (1972). See also
Hough, Admiralty Jurisdiction--of Late Years, 37 HAv. L. Rlv. 529, 531 (1924).
110. See Earles v. Union Barge Line Corp., 486 F.2d 1097 (3d Cir. 1973). See
also Crosson v. Vance, 484 F.2d 840 (4th Cir. 1973), wherein the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals denied admiralty jurisdiction in a suit brought by a water skier
against the operator of the towing motor boat. Though the court noted earlier cases
in which pleasure boat activity was regarded as properly within admiralty jurisdiction,
the court felt that the reference to King v. Testerman, 214 F. Supp. 335 (E.D. Tenn.
1963), by the Supreme Court in Executive Jet, 409 U.S. at 256 n.2, as an example
of the potentially absurd results of the locality test, was an explicit rejection of the
contention that these activities could supply the necessary "maritime relationship" re-
quirement of the new jurisdictional rule. Id. at 842; cf. Moye v. Henderson, No. 73-
1871 (8th Cir. filed May 8, 1974). See generally Adams v. Montana Power Co., 354
F. Supp. 1111 (D. Mont. 1973); 33 Miss. L.J. 1013 (1973).
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juries are sustained."'
Additional Variables Within the "Locality Plus" Rule
One other case following the "locality plus" formula, the recent
decision in Onley v. South Carolina Electric & Gas Co.," 2 further illus-
trates the futility of jurisdictional litigation in an area in which the
courts have failed to give a clear procedural definition to elements of
the jurisdictional rule which they attempt to apply. The district court
rendered one of the most unstructured decisions dealing with the new
jurisdictional rule among the post-Executive Jet cases. Moreover,
the court of appeals, though clear in the reasons for its decision on
the jurisdictional point, also clearly evinced the practical ambiguity of
the jurisdictional rule of Executive Jet. The libel in this case arose
when the plaintiff was injured while diving from a dock on Lake Mur-
ray, striking a submerged boat ramp. The plaintiff sued the South
Carolina Electric and Gas Company, which owned and controlled the
lake up to the high water or contour mark and used the waters for
the generation of electricity. The plaintiff asserted admiralty jurisdic-
tion, alleging that the defendant's control of the level of an entire body
of navigable water entailed maritime activities. The power company
answered that the tort did not occur on navigable waters, did not have
a maritime locality, and did not have the required maritime nexus. In
the argument of the case, the parties focused upon the maritime nexus
requirement, and little was said regarding the assumed navigability
at the situs of the tort."3  The court, however, held that jurisdiction
was absent due to a categorical exclusion of the plaintiff's activity-
swimming-from the domain of maritime concern. Replying to the
plaintiff's argument regarding the maritime character of the defend-
ant's activity, the court asserted that "they make light-the Supreme
Court does-of causes such as swimming cases. They just say that
swimming cases have got nothing to do with maritime activities."'"
Ill. See Ross v. Mobil Oil Corp., 474 F.2d 989 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1012 (1973). See note 110 supra.
112. 488 F.2d 758 (4th Cir. 1973).
113. See Record at 3, Onley v. South Carolina Elec. & Gas. Co., Civil No. 72-1455
(D.S.C., filed Mar. 5, 1973). The District Judge at the outset of the argument asserted
that the principal and controlling question was the presence of a maritime nexus, and
later resolved the case on this point
114 Record at 15, Onley v. South Carolina Elec. & Gas. Co., Civil No. 72-1455
(D.S.C., filed Mar. 5, 1973). The court was evidently referring to the Supreme Court's
citation of the American Law Institute's Study of the Division of Jurisdiction
Between State and Federal Courts in the Executive Jet decision. See 409 U.S. 249,
257-58 (1972). The district judge in Onley repeatedly asserted the categorical lack of
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In a particularly unperceptive opinion, the court on one hand disposed
of the case on the ground -that swimming could never provide a mari-
time nexus, while on the other hand it said that jurisdiction was lacking
because it could find "no substantial relationship between the tort
complained of and traditional maritime activity."'115 Thus, locality was
virtually ignored, and the opinion provides no guidelines as to what
procedure to employ in determining the content of a maritime nexus.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the
locality issue, along with the maritime nexus, was argued. 116 The
court of appeals discounted the role of locality under the new test,
and proceeded directly -to the maritime nexus requirement, stating that
"[wihatever the role of the locality test in determining admiralty ju-
risdiction after Executive Jet Aviation, the Supreme Court clearly re-
stricted such jurisdiction by adding the requirement of a nexus to tra-
ditional maritime aotivity.""' 7  The case was found to be lacking on
the latter point. The approach of the court of appeals in determining
the maritime nexus, however, differed from -that used by the district
court. Distinguishing cases cited by the plaintiff in an effort to estab-
lish the maritime character of the defendant's activity, the Court found
that the activity of the defendant was in fact not maritime." 8  The
court of appeals stated:
We hold that appellee's control of the water level of a lake for
the purpose of generating electricity, which results in a diving accident,
does not bear a sufficiently significant relationship to traditional mari-
time activity to create federal admiralty jurisdiction. While the control
of the water level of a navigable waterway may, in some cases, have
an intimate relationship with maritime activities, there is no such mari-
time connection where a diving accident is the only consequence. 1 9
connection between swimming and any maritime concern: "Now a swimming accident,
however it might happen, has got nothing to do with any business conducted on naviga-
ble waters or business of the sea. There is no connection between maritime activities,
that I can see, and a swimming accident . .." Record, supra, at 22. "[Y]ou have
got to have some nexus with what you and I and the courts have established as a mari-
time activity, and swimming itself is not a maritime activity." Id. at 23.
115. Onley v. South Carolina Elec. & Gas. Co., Civil No. 72-1455 at 3 (D.S.C., filed
Mar. 5, 1973).
116. Brief of Appellee at 10, Onley v. South Carolina Elec. & Gas. Co., 488 F.2d
758 (1973).
117. 488 F.2d at 759.
118. Id. at 760. Rubin v. Power Authority, 356 F. Supp. 1169 (W.D.N.Y. 1973),
discussed in note 108 supra, Adams v. Montana Power Co., 354 F. Supp. 111 (D.
Mont. 1973), and McCall v. Susquehanna Elec. Co., 278 F. Supp. 209 (D. Md. 1968),
were the cases principally discussed by the court of appeals in Onley.
119. 488 F.2d at 760.
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Thus the district court and the court of appeals were able to reach
the same result by different jurisdictional approaches. The district
court seized upon a superficially plausible rationale for denying juris-
diction, though it declined to think through the variations in meaning
of the Executive Jet opinion and the task of giving form to the rule.
It thus adopted a "plaintiff's exclusionary rule" by categorizing the
plaintiff's activity as per se "un-maritime." On the other hand, the
court of appeals employed a defendant-oriented test and analogized this
case to other cases involving an analysis of the relationship between
the activities of the defendant and maritime matters. This, plus the
indeterminancy in both the district court's and the court of appeals'
opinions as to the role of locality clearly illustrates the ambiguity in-
herent in the rule as formulated in Executive Jet.
To reiterate, the formulation of a jurisdictional rule in the Onley
decisions-such as it is formulated-is clearly insufficient. If the
nature of these holdings and the language of ,the courts in argument is
indicative of any formal rendition of a rule, it amounts to a process
of denominating a certain class of activities which cannot support ad-
miralty jurisdiction, no matter what the cause of the injury or nature
of the defendant might be. But the difficulty inherent in any such
denomination is readily exposed. If the plaintiff in Luna v. Star of
India, for example, had been a swimmer rather -than a visitor to the
vessel, or if a swimmer had been run down by a vessel, the Onley
test, taken literally from the district court, would foreclose the consid-
eration of compelling maritime concerns or policies related to the de-
fendant. It would, as applied by the district court, be as rigid and
susceptible to irrational results as the pure locality test. If the rule
is thought to be a mandate for the denial of jurisdiction anytime a sin-
gle significant element of the litigation is found by the court to be
"non-maritime," then the failure of the court to enunciate the criteria
for detecting the characteristics of significant "maritime" elements is
no better than an abandonment of the problem to ad hoc determina-
tions, which is to have no rule at all. Only slightly better is the ap-
proach used by the court of appeals. However, if that rule's content
were to be more extensively articulated and the significance of locality
resolved, it could come close to fulfilling the rational objectives of Ex-
ecutive Jet and to presenting an efficient, formal jurisdictional test.
FORMULATING A NEw JURISDICTIONAL RULE
In order to delineate the formal content of -the current law of
admiralty jurisdiction, it is necessary to define the functional aspects
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of the Executive Jet decision and its progeny, and to place this land-
mark decision in -the broader patterns of recent jurisdictional history.
From the results of the foregoing analysis of the lower courts' attempts
to apply the new rule promulgated by Executive Jet, it is apparent
that the rule of Executive Jet is by no means uniformly understood
or applied.120  The difficulty, we hope to prove, lies not in the direc-
tion in which the Court has generally moved, but in its failure to sever
all formal ties with the old locality criterion and to reduce the iule
to a formula which can be implemented with a minimum of delay and
deliberation. As the rule is currently employed, however, the effi-
ciency of judicial resources and the predictability of the resultant deci-
sions are probably both lower under Executive Jet than they were un-
der the old (sometimes irrational) locality rule. It is our contention
that efficiency and predictability need not be sacrificed in order to
achieve rational results in admiralty jurisdiotions. The old rules were
not bad because they had form, but because of the substantive results
which the form came to produce. The new rule will not necessarily
be enhanced by a lack of form.
We posit at the outset that it is desirable, if not necessary, for
the elements of a jurisdictional rule to have some definite form and
to be applied in some clearly ordered manner. The obvious diver-
gence in the various interpretations given to the rule by different
courts, even when applied to the same facts at different stages of a
single suit's litigation, e.g., the Onley litigation'2 ' or Executive Jet it-
self,1 22 reveal that without assuming a more definitive form the cur-
rent rule will never achieve a satisfactory degree of efficiency. The
contradictory results reached in the Jiles and Luna cases, 23 which pre-
sented substantially identical fact situations, indicate further the sheer
unpredictability of the rule as it is now constituted.
The problems involved in creating a satisfactory jurisdictional rule
are, however, not peculiar to the area of admiralty jurisdiction in tort
litigation. Many of the same difficulties which the courts of admiralty
are now experiencing were also encountered in the wake of Interna-
tional Shoe Co. v. Washington,124 which analogously introduced juris-
120. See notes 59-72 supra and accompanying text.
121. See notes 112-19 supra and accompanying text.
122. See notes 40-57 supra and accompanying text.
123. See notes 77-79, 99-105 supra and accompanying text.
124. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). Our criticism of Executive Jet and our formulation of
a test for admiralty jurisdiction in tort have been heavily influenced by the Supreme
Court's evolution of a test for state court jurisdiction from Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S.
714 (1877) to Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958). The similarities in the Su-
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dictional reforms into state court jurisdiction on a conceptual rather
than practical level. The process specified an evaluation particularly
of the interests and conditions of -the parties in any given case,' with
a primary concern for avoiding unfairness -and inconvenience for the
defendant,12 6 in an effort to achieve intuitively reasonable results. The
classic formulae from the older jurisdictional rules, such as in rem and
in personam, were relegated to a lesser position of descriptive labels' 27
rather than the essence of the rule itself. 2 " Yet in the midst of these
preme Court's past approach to jurisdictional problems in the areas of admiralty and
state court jurisdiction are striking. Like the locality rule in tort, state court jurisdic-
tion under Pennoyer was thought to depend upon natural "power" limitations that re-
strained the states' ability to adjudicate controversies between their own citizens and
nonresidents. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722-23, 733-34 (1877). In fact, no
such physical barriers to the exercise of state authority exist in our system. Rather,
the only limiting principles imposed upon the states are contained in the Constitution
of the United States, and the Supreme Court is the ultimate expositor of the provisions
of that document. See Kurland, The Supreme Court, The Due Process Clause and the
In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts, 25 U. Cm. L. REv. 569, 585 (1958). The
primary contribution of International Shoe was the Court's recognition of its responsi-
bility for the articulation of rational jurisdictional principles to govern state court juris-
diction over nonresidents. As in its approach to admiralty jurisdiction over tort in
Executive Jet, the Court has apparently not yet discarded all vestiges of the old physi-
cal power tests of state court jurisdiction. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235
(1958). However, the "minimum contacts" test of International Shoe had added clar-
ity to the area of state court jurisdiction and supplied a more accurate reflection, analy-
tically speaking, of state court authority over nonresidents in our federal system. It
is urged that Executive Jet represents the initial step in a similar evolution of a rational
test of admiralty jurisdiction over tort. For a more complete description of the devel-
opments in state court jurisdiction, see e.g., Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Per-
sonal Jurisdiction: The Power Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289 (1956);
Hazard, A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 SUPREME COURT REV. 241;
Kurland, supra; von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested
Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1121 (1966); Note, Developments in the Law-State Court
Jurisdiction, 73 HARv. L. REv. 909 (1960).
125. See Hess v. Palowski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927) (the defendant, a nonresident,
caused injuries within the state by the negligent operation of his automobile); Schutt
v. Commercial Travelers Mut. Accident Ass'n of America, 229 F.2d 158 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 351 U.S. 940 (1956). Here the contact with the forum amounted to being
the insurer of a resident of the forum who had moved to the forum state after taking out
the policy of insurance. The passive fiduciary relationship of a nonresident defendant
with parties within the forum state was considered sufficient to support a limited type
of judgment against the nonresident in Atkinson v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 338,
316 P.2d 960 (1957).
126. See Note, supra note 124, at 924.
127. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), where the Supreme Court states:
"While the in rem and in personam classifications do not exhaust all the situations that
give rise to jurisdiction, they are adequate to describe the affiliating circumstances sug-
gested here, and accordingly serve as a useful means of approach to this case." Id.
at 246 (footnote omitted).
128. However, at times the substance as well as the form of the old rules still seems
to be resorted to in the disposition of difficult cases, both in the Supreme Court and
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striking developments in rethinking and redefining the old rules, there
remained the underlying distinctions between state and federal law es-
sential to the construction of an efficient, flexible federal system of
government. 129
In much the same manner, the Supreme Court has issued a new
jurisdictional rule for admiralty jurisdiction. Executive Jet, while em-
bracing the concept of a rationally based rule for the power of the
admiralty courts, has likewise declined to address itself to the problems
inherent in the number of various practical applications which the rule
can assume.13  Although the precipitating impetus for the introduc-
tion of the new rule arose out of the modem problems unique to avia-
tion accident litigation, the Executive Jet decision reflects the need
for similar conceptual adjustment in the rule throughout the area of
maritime jurisdiction.' 3 ' The new rule is certainly intended to control
cases arising out of the modem problems of aquatic recreation, oil
in lower federal courts. See Hanson v. Denekla, 357 U.S. 235, 250 (1958), for a
rather literal application of the in rem concept; Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 849 (1969), where the court, in upholding jurisdiction
on a rehearing en banc, relied heavily on the case of Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215
(1905).
129. In retrospect, it seems apparent that the restrictive view of state authority over
nonresidents represented by Pennoyer would have, if left unmitigated, seriously im-
paired the regulatory power of the states in times of expanding corporate enterprise.
Even the fictional theories of "consent" and "presence," which were developed in miti-
gation of the strict rule of Pennoyer, were doctrinally inadequate in terms of the view
they represented of the federal system. Their deficiencies have been articulately de-
scribed by Professor Phillip Kurland:
The real difficulty underlying these attempts to work out a rationale for
personal jurisdiction lay in the fact that the doctrines were borrowed from
laws relating to wholly independent sovereignties which were not relevant tojurisdictions joined in a federation. The basic premise for such decisions was
"that a judgment. . . is necessarily something to be enforced and that a state
which is physically impotent to enforce its judgments should be treated as le-
gally incompetent to adjudicate ...... But with the Full Faith and Credit
Clause as an overriding principle, such a premise only puts the question; it
does not answer it. The real question becomes not whether a state itself
could enforce a judgment, but rather under what circumstances the national
power should be used to assist the extra-territorial enforcement of a state'sjudicial decrees. Kurland, supra note 124, at 585 (footnotes omitted).
The true contribution of International Shoe to the concept of federalism lay in its rec-
ognition that the national power should stand ready to assist the states in asserting au-
thority over nonresidents in a broader variety of cases. The states have responded to
this invitation to copartnership by the enactment of broader-based long arm statutes.
See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 17 (Smith-Hurd 1968). Thus the total picture of
the interaction between state and federal law after International Shoe portrays a more
efficient and flexible federal system than existed under Pennoyer.
130. See text accompanying notes 60-65 supra.
131. See Nations v. Morris, 483 F.2d 577, 585 n.27 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1071 (1973). The Supreme Court clearly did not limit the scope of its discussion
to either traditional maritime or aviation torts. See 409 U.S. at 256 n.6.
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transportation, seaplane accidents, and so forth.'8 2 Whereas no par-
ticular inconvenience of venue to the defendant is a consideration in
choosing an admiralty forum, the inconveniences and increased bur-
dens of following a specialized body of substantive law and -the lack
of a general statute of limitations should be of relevance to the consid-
eration of admiralty jurisdiction, if the defendant himself is not a per-
son whom the substantive law of admiralty was intended to reach.131
At the same time, the court has also reasserted its concern for main-
taining a proper balance between state and federal law in the admir-
alty area,1 34 and this factor should also enter into the assertion of juris-
diction by a court of admiralty.
Similarly, the role of locality in admiralty has changed from that
of a designation which was once reasonable, in that in former times
it likely signaled "a congeries of other significant affiliations with the
forum that would, upon proper analysis, ground jurisdiction,"'", to a
less significant portion of a broader-scoped jurisdictional test, a portion
which, like the designation "in rem," really only served as a label in
the first place. As a mere label, therefore, the 'term has properly lost
its jurisdictional significance. 3 ' The situations evidencing the break-
down and inefficiency of the locality rule were ones in which the me-
chanical application of the rule brought cases into the court which,
on a rational basis, would be excluded, 137 and excluded cases which
were logically identical to those which the locality rule would in-
clude. 138 The locality rule necessarily reaches this absurd result be-
cause it operates inflexibly. Yet, strict reliance on a maritime locality
test to deny jurisdiotion is not entirely rational, since the locality con-
cept may be in fact a derivative concept of the maritime relation-
ship. 39 Moreover, the locality test has been subject to numerous in-
132. See, e.g., Crosson v. Vance, 484 F.2d 840 (4th Cir. 1973); Adams v. Montana
Power Co., 354 F. Supp. 1111 (D. Mont. 1973).
133. See Onley v. South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co., 488 F.2d 758 (4th Cir. 1973).
134. See Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325 (1973).
135. von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 124, at 1138.
136. In order to be an effective jurisdictional label, a term of art must entail certain
jurisdictional results by itself. If the finding of "in rem," "in personam" Or "maritime
locality" is not of ultimate jurisdictional consequence, then some further, more basic
concept has in effect preempted the jurisdictional field, leaving the old label itself of
little significance.
137. For example, the "injured swimmer" cases cited in Executive Jet, 409 U.S. at
256 n.5.
138. See the Supreme Court's discussion of T. Smith & Son v. Taylor and Minnie
v. Port Huron Terminal Co., 409 U.S. at 255.
139. See Adams v. Montana Power Co., 354 F. Supp. 1111 (D. Mont. 1973). The
court explains that a locality is not designated as a maritime locality unless a tradi-
tional maritime activity is conducted upon the waters at that locality. Id, at 1112,
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roads explicitly based on maritime relationships or policies, and ex-
perience with physical or quantitative tests such as locality or presence
has demonstrated that their utility and certainty may well be more ap-
parent than real.140  Therefore, -the movement toward an analytical
jurisdictional rule, as was the case in International Shoe, should turn
away from the use of rigid and other irrational conclusory labels.
Thus it is submitted that locality should have no place in the new
jurisdictional rule. It makes no more sense to exclude from admiralty
jurisdiction on the basis of locality a case which should be within it
(in that it satisfies maritme relationship requirements) than to include
a case which should be excluded. Yet locality operates equally as a
mechanical inclusionary and exclusionary rule. Nor can it be coun-
,tered that congressional action is required to expunge the locality test
from the rule of admiralty jurisdiction, since the basic jurisdictional
grant is broad enough to permit several definitions of "arising in -ad-
miralty or maritime' connections.' 4 ' Hence, any formulation of the
jurisdictional test which involves locality as a formal part of the rule
poses the risk of defeating the principal objective of the new test:
Thus, the finding of a maritime locality is dependent upon a prior finding that the lo-
cality is used for maritime activities, and hence the locality finding is derived from that
prior determination. For a similar result in finding the presence of a "vessel," see
Luna v. Star of India, 356 F. Supp. 59 (S.D. Cal. 1973).
140. The responsibilities of various parties prescribed by substantive maritime law
render locality irrelevant to jurisdictional decisions in areas covered by those substan-
tive principles. For example, consider the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act
provisions extending employer liability to injured employees shoreward. 33 U.S.C. §§
901 et seq. (Supp. II, 1972). Consider the liability of the vessel owner for shoreside
injuries to seamen under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970). Likewise consider
the liability for shoreside injuries caused by a vessel under the general maritime law
doctrine of unseaworthiness. Consider Gutierrez v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 373 U.S.
206 (1963), and the congressional abrogation of the locality rule in cases involving
shore damage caused by vessels under the Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act, 46
U.S.C. § 740 (1970), as well as the substantive policies in the general maritime law
doctrine of maintenance and cure, under which locality is irrelevant for jurisdictional
purposes. It is also interesting to notice how this effect of substantive law considera-
tions in some cases allows the plaintiff to assert a cause of action in such a way as
to support jurisdiction under one theory where the absence of locality would prevent
it under another, e.g., the sustaining of jurisdiction on a complaint amended to include
a count sounding in contract after the denial of jurisdiction for want of proper locality
in a tort action. Thomson v. Cheasapeake Yacht Club, Inc., 255 F. Supp. 555, 559
(D. Md. 1965).
141. The breadth of the jurisdictional grant is illustrated in note 7 supra, discussing
the decisional process whereby the "tidewater limitation" was eventually discarded in
favor of the locality test. It is interesting to note that from a very early date acts
of Congress purporting to define the extent of admiralty jurisdiction over certain waters
have been superseded by judicial decision reinterpreting earlier general maritime juris-
dictional grants. See D. ROBERTSON, supra note 7, at 117, which discusses the Supreme
Court's decision in The Eagle, 75 U.S. 15 (1868).
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avoiding "absurd" results by insuring that cases brought within the
admiralty jurisdiction have a rational connection or relationship with
the policies and purposes of maritime law. 142  For example, if the test
requires a determination of locality in any form, either before the
maritime nexus determination (or perhaps even in lieu of it) or af-
terwards as an exclusionary rule in cases where maritime nexus is sup-
portable, it will only serve to produce results that are just as absurd
as those the Supreme Court sought to remedy in Executive Jet or
else to serve no additional function at all. The only reasonable result
dictated by Executive Jet is the interpretation that the locality test has
been effectively rejected,14- leaving the maritime nexus as the only
operative portion of the rule of admiralty jurisdiction. Nevertheless,
without additional focus, the maritime nexus test itself would spawn
excessive litigation and would threaten to consume an inordinate
amount of judicial energy and litigant time in groping for resolutions
under an unpredictable jurisdictional test. Therefore, it becomes nec-
essary for commentators and for the courts to attempt to define
the characteristics which inhere in the fundamental concept of the
"maritime nexus."' 44
142. It is just as important to establish as a guiding jurisdictional principle that the
admiralty powers of the federal courts should not be employed without assuring that
supporting substantive policies will thereby be served, as it is to enumerate all of those
substantive policies in all maritime areas. The latter task is beyond the scope of this
Article and, moreover, beyond the coverage of most good hornbooks. Thus the exam-
ples of substantive policies at stake in the cases discussed should suffice to illustrate
the principal advantage of our proposed test: that it adverts one to the substantive poli-
cies and developed lines of case law in the maritime area involved in his case, directly
or by analogy, rather than attempting to enumerate an inclusive checklist of all sub-
stantive maritime concerns. The employment by analogy of cases dealing with the def-
inition of vessels and involving the maritime policies of regulating this important instru-
ment of maritime commerce can be observed in the Higginbotham case. See text ac-
companying note 97 supra. Likewise, the case law concerning seamen and the different
but equally important policy of providing uniform regulation over them may be seen
as a substantive analogy used to support jurisdiction in other cases. Our point is, of
course, that only some cases do this with any precision and hardly any with settled
procedural techniques. Thus our proposed rule in settling the functional, procedural
focus serves to allow the litigant to employ the easily discoverable substantive back-
ground in his case which will or will not make it "maritime" rather than attempting
to catalog all maritime things.
143. The other interpretations, see text accompanying notes 60-65 supra, all retain
a significant role for the locality aspect in the jurisdictional test.
144. Another attempt to resolve the ambiguous jurisdictional rule into a more work-
able standard may be found in Note, Admiralty lurisdiction." Executive Jet in Historical
Perspective, supra note 7. Those authors do not advert to the diversity of pro-
cedural approaches to applying the jurisdictional test employed by the various courts
in the Executive Jet litigation. Id. at 366. They do, however, advocate that lo-
cality should not be used to preclude admiralty jurisdiction where other "maritime
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To this end we propose the following jurisdictional test, to be
used in all tort cases involving general maritime law, that is, where
no statute with special jurisdictional provisions is applicable:
That jurisdiction to adjudicate tort cases in admiralty should be
asserted (i) in any case involving the commission of a tort by a mari-
time defendant or (ii) in the absence of (i), above, where a tort is
committed against a maritime plaintiff.
The maritime character of the defendant in classic situations
would be defined by the presence of a commercial maritime vessel
or its instrumentalities as the tortfeasor. Where a classic maritime
agency is not involved, the post-Executive Jet cases already point to
a process of assessing the maritime character of the defendant by a
sort of functional analog to classic maritime activities, such as was the
case when a helicopter was performing the functions of a crewboat, 145
or as in the analogy between ocean voyages and transoceanic flights
suggested in Executive Jet1 46 and followed in Hark v. Antilles Airboats,
nexus" factors are present, and they attempt to articulate the contents of the "mari-
time nexus" test. Id. at 369. They include among relevant "maritime nexus" fac-
tors (1) locality, (2) state governmental interest, (3) national governmental in-
terest, and (4) the integrity of admiralty law. However, such an approach to solving
the problems created by the new jurisdictional rule is insufficient in that it fails to ar-
rive at either a definition based on the functions and interests of the parties or proce-
dural clarity. Further, following the case of Kelly v. Smith, 485 F.2d 520 (5th Cir.
1973), they articulate a number of reasonable policy objectives or ends without provid-
ing sufficient procedural definition for the jurisdictional rule. In short, the ends are
defined without reference to a definition of the means. We argue that it is essential
to have a jurisdictional test which even though designed to serve such objectives, does
more than list them. The constant groping for some rule with formal definition which
will in most cases serve the numerated policy goals is one of the main characteristics
of the post-Executive Jet jurisdictional litigation and a pervasive symptom of the failure
of the new test to meet the standards of a "good" jurisdictional rule.
145. Higginbotham v. Mobil Oil Corp., 357 F. Supp. 1164 (W.D. La. 1973), discussed
in notes 97-98 supra. For a case employing the same approach as Higginbotham, but
reaching a different result, see Teachey v. United States, 363 F. Supp. 1197 (M.D. Fla.
1973). There the court denied admiralty jurisdiction in a suit by a plaintiff killed in
a Coast Guard helicopter after being rescued by the helicopter from a sinking boat.
The court upheld the defendant's motion to dismiss despite plaintiff's argument that the
helicopter vas engaged in the ordinary functions of a boat, and thus satisfied the "mari-
time nexus" test. The court denied jurisdiction because the helicopter crashed after it
had completed the rescue operation and while it was in route to another destination
after refueling on land. The court stated:
This argument fails, however, in that the complaint alleges specifically that
the helicopter crashed, not in the performance of an air sea rescue operation,
but rather after the rescue had been effected. . . . In the view of this Court,
the mere transportation of the decedent by aircraft from one Coast Guard
base to another does not constitute a sufficient act of performing a function
traditionally performed by waterborne vessels so as to bring it within the dic-
tum statement enunciated in Executive Jet. . . . Id. at 1199.
146. 409 U.S. at 271.
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Inc. 4  This test permits of flexible and yet definable results.
The test proposed here would initially focus upon the agency caus-
ing the harm to insure application of uniform principles of maritime
law whenever that agency can be rationally identified as having essen-
tially a maritime function. It would, in addition to providing proce-
dural clarity, be sufficiently broad so as not to exclude matters from
admiralty jurisdiction which should be within it, a result which might
be produced by the application of the narrow, rather undefined "plain-
tiff's exclusionary approach" taken in Onley v. South Carolina Electric
& Gas Co.,148 or the rule which assumes that the cases are sufficiently
clear so -that jurisdictional "borderline" cases can be treated under a
special "borderline" application of the rule. 49
Furthermore, the maritime character of a plaintiff, if necessary,
would be determined by the same analytic method, requiring either
a conventional seaman or some other plaintiff engaged in a function
traditionally performed by a maritime agent in order to invoke admir-
alty jurisdiction This branch of the test is -necessary and appropriate
to insure that admiralty jurisdiction is not mechanically granted or de-
nied, but in all cases may be invoked only on the basis of -a full con-
sideration of the functions performed by all -the parties to the action
at the time the tort arose. 50  It should not make any difference
whether the maritime party is on the plaintiff's side of the lawsuit in-
stead of that of the defendant, for to make the jurisdiction turn on
that distinction alone would simply reward the first to reach the court-
house.
The great majority of all cases will probably be determined under
provision (i) in the proposed rule, concerning a maritime defendant.
It would rarely be necessary to resort to provision (ii) to resolve a
jurisdictional dispute. For example, virtually all of the post-Executive
147. 355 F. Supp. 683 (D.V.I. 1973).
148. See text accompanying notes 113-15 supra.
149. See Maryland v. Amerada Hess Corp., 356 F. Supp. 975 (D. Md. 1973).
'150. For an example of a case dealing with injury to a maritime plaintiff as opposed
to injury caused by a maritime defendant, see Oppen v. Aetna Ins. Co., 485 F.2d 252
(9th Cir. 1973). This case dealt with suits against the insurer of an oil company by
the owner of private pleasure boats whose craft were damaged by oil spills from the
company's offshore drilling platform. In upholding admiralty jurisdiction, the court
stated:
In our case plaintiffs sought damages for physical injury to maritime vessels
and for interference with their right of navigation. Such claims do bear a
significant relationship to traditional maritime activity. It is precisely plain-
tiffs' alleged rights to engage in "traditional maritime activity" that they are
seeking to protect. Id. at 257.
Thus, this case would clearly fit within part (ii) of our proposed test.
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Jet jurisdictional decisions involved a defendant who was allegedly
maritime or engaged in traditional maritime activities or their equiva-
lent. Moreover, it would be rare that a plaintiff who would under
the proposed test be considered maritime would not be accompanied
by a similarly martime defendant. Such an unlikely case might be
the effective reverse of the situation in Star of India, where a vessel
would sue a passenger or visitor for property damage to the vessel.
The first category of the proposed rule would, then, effectively deal
with all but the occasional case. Further, possible exceptions could,
if necessary, be made in the application of the latter provision of the
proposed rule, section (ii), which would not disturb the consistency
and efficiency of jurisdictional adjudication precisely because occasions
for the use of such exceptions would be rare.
CONCLUSION
Professor Black in 1950 characterized his critique of the admir-
alty jurisdictional tests as an attempt "to provoke discussion of the
present basic scheme for the allocation of judicial jurisdiction in mari-
time cases, rather than to present a new plan thought to be defensible
from all angles."'151 His general suggestions for change were, in his
own words, "an invitation to further definition at lower levels of gen-
erality." 152  This aim is as important and, unfortunately, as unfulfilled
now as it was then. However, the trends and theoretical changes in
jurisdictional case law have assumed more definition in the past twen-
ty-five years, and now provide an observable pattern which points the
way -to probable future developments. Out of this pattern we hope
to have provided the sought-after 'lower level of generality in the area
of admiralty tort jurisdiction by pointing to the most plausible and use-
ful jurisdictional approaches employed in the modern case law. If the
test we suggest does not in whole or in part emerge in future experi-
ments, we at least hope to have provoked some of the essential discus-
sion and analysis which Professor Black advocated long ago.
151. Black, supra note 1, at 280.
152. Id.
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